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Abstract. The design and implementation of cloud services, without taking under 
consideration the forensic requirements and the investigation process, makes the 
acquisition and examination of data, complex and demanding. The evidence 
gathered from the cloud may not become acceptable and admissible in the court. 
A literature gap in supporting software engineers so as to elicit and model foren-
sic-related requirements exists. In order to fill the gap, software engineers should 
develop cloud services in a forensically sound manner. In this paper, a brief de-
scription of the cloud forensic-enabled framework is presented (adding some new 
elements) so as to understand the role of the design of forensic-enabled cloud 
services in a cloud forensic investigation. A validation of the forensic require-
ments is also produced by aligning the stages of cloud forensic investigation pro-
cess with the framework’s forensic requirements. In this way, on one hand, a 
strong relationship is built between these two elements and emphasis is given to 
the role of the forensic requirements and their necessity in supporting the inves-
tigation process. On the other hand, the alignment assists towards the identifica-
tion of the degree of the forensic readiness of a cloud service against a forensic 
investigation. 
Keywords: Cloud Forensics, Forensic Requirements, Cloud Forensic Investiga-
tion Process, Forensic Readiness, Forensic Constraints. 
1 Introduction 
Since the early days of Cloud Forensics discipline, introduced by Ruan [1], both soft-
ware engineers and investigators have put a lot of effort to identify the issues of the 
new discipline and find appropriate solutions. There are many issues associated with 
legal matters, multi-tenancy, flexibility of deleting instances, data replication, location 
transparency and dependence on Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) that are unique to 
cloud forensics and makes the investigation even more complex than in the traditional 
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environments [1-5]). Investigators’ main objective is to conduct an investigation in the 
cloud in a forensically sound manner and present evidence that can be admissible in a 
court of law. In order to achieve these goals, investigators should be able to rely both 
on cloud services that are designed and implemented by software engineers and on the 
investigation process. Therefore, a strong cooperation between software engineers and 
investigators is necessary. Software engineers should be able to design and implement 
forensic-enabled cloud services so as to assist investigators in case of an incident.  
Thus, the aim of the specific paper is to examine how the design and implementation 
of a service can assist investigators in a cloud forensic investigation. Cloud Service 
Providers are responsible for providing cloud services to consumers. According to a 
report, 96% of small, medium business and enterprises are using cloud services [6]. A 
cloud incident may exploit possible vulnerabilities of the cloud services and gain access 
or harm sensible data. Hence, the cloud service concept plays an important role in a 
cloud forensic investigation. A great challenge for software engineers is to identify the 
forensic requirements and design cloud services in a forensically sound manner. To 
accomplish this, they need to understand the cloud forensic investigation process and 
how it is conducted.   
NAS report (page 181) states that “some agencies still treat the examination of digital 
evidence as an investigative rather than a forensic activity” [7]. The proposed frame-
work introduced in a way to eliminate the burden of an investigation. It introduces the 
activities to implement a service so as in case of an incident the outcome of the inves-
tigation should be in accordance to the forensic guidelines and principles. All the inci-
dents should be investigated either forensically or not. In this paper the proposed frame-
work achieves the first. 
Within this work, an alignment of the design of cloud forensic-enabled services is 
introduced after an explanation of the forensic requirements, in order first to describe 
how cloud services can become forensic-enabled and second to understand the role of 
the design of forensic-enabled cloud services in a cloud forensic investigation. The pa-
per also extends our previous work [8] in the direction of adding a new stage in the 
process that software engineers may follow for eliciting, modeling, implementing and 
validating forensic requirements in cloud services. The proposed process is at high level 
thus, it can be applied in any digital forensic with appropriate adjustments. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the work that has 
been done so far in relation to cloud forensic investigation and the different processes 
or models introduced by researchers. Section 3 presents a cloud forensic analysis con-
sisting of the cloud forensic high level requirements that a service need to include in its 
design and implementation stages as well as the framework for reasoning about cloud 
forensics so as to make the specific cloud service forensic-enabled. Section 4 aligns the 
different stages of the cloud investigation process with the forensic constraints in order 
to validate the forensic requirements. Section 5 presents a validation approach of the 
work, while section 6 concludes the paper by raising future research on this innovative 
research field. 
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2 Cloud Forensic Investigation 
One of the most important aspect of implementing a cloud forensic-enabled service is 
to actually understand how a cloud investigation is conducted. Therefore, a research 
had to be made in order to design the cloud investigation process. Cloud forensics in-
troduces processes for resolving incidents occurring in cloud computing environments. 
However, designing cloud services capable to assist a cloud investigation process is of 
vital importance and various research efforts concentrate on these directions [8, 9]. In 
addition, digital forensics methods cannot support an investigation in cloud environ-
ments since the particular environments introduce many differences compared to tradi-
tional IT environments [1, 10]. 
2.1 Related Work 
In the past years, a number of researchers introduced methodologies and frameworks 
in relation to the cloud investigation process. In 2012, Martini et al. [11] proposed the 
Integrated Conceptual Digital Forensic Framework for Cloud Computing, which is 
based on McKemmish [12] and Kent et al. [13]. The framework emphasizes on the 
differences in the preservation of forensic data and the collection of cloud computing 
data for forensic purposes. It includes four stages, identification and preservation, col-
lection, examination and analysis, and reporting and presentation. According to 
Agarwal et al. [14], the iteration of the framework demonstrates one of the key differ-
ences in the identification and analysis of evidence sources. 
The same year Ruan et al. [15] presented the Cloud Forensic Maturity Model 
(CFMM). It is a reference model for evaluating and improving cloud forensic maturity. 
The model is composed of a Cloud Forensic Investigative Architecture (CFIA) and a 
Cloud Forensic Capability Matrix (CFCM). The CFIA introduces four main sections: 
pre-investigative readiness, core-forensic process, supportive processes and investiga-
tive interfaces. The CFCM is a capability maturity model that consists of six maturity 
levels. The model is a step forward towards an acceptable solution for cloud forensic 
investigation. 
In 2015, Open Cloud Forensics (OCF) model was introduced by Zawoad et al. [16]. 
It proposes a cloud forensic process, which consists of the preservation stage, which 
runs throughout the process and the stages of identification, collection, organization, 
presentation and verification. Examination and analysis is included in the organization 
stage. During the verification stage, the court authority verifies the cloud-based evi-
dence provided by the investigators. Considering the important role of CSPs, the pro-
posed model can support reliable forensics in a realistic scenario. As stated by the au-
thors, cloud architects can use the model to design clouds that support trustworthy cloud 
forensics investigations.  
There are also some other proposed models concerning cloud forensics such as Ad-
ams et al. [17] and Guo et al. [18] but there are limitations mostly in relation to the later 
stages. Both models do not include any actions or stages after the evidence collection 
and acquisition. Therefore, the stages of examination, analysis and presentation are out 
of the scope of the researchers. 
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2.2 Proposed Cloud Forensic Investigation Process 
Simou et al. [9] presented a comparison framework to merge same or similar stages of 
the previous proposed frameworks and models that produce the same outcome into one 
stage. The comparison framework consists of the following four sequential stages: iden-
tification, preservation-collection, examination-analysis, and presentation and two con-
current stages, the chain of custody and documentation. Authors stated that the preser-
vation stage should also run concurrently with the other two stages or should be in-
cluded in the chain of custody. Based on the comparison framework and the literature 
review conducted in [10], Simou et al. [9] proposed a generic process for cloud-forensic 
investigation including the steps of Incident Confirmation, Incident Identification, Col-
lection-Acquisition, Examination-Analysis, and Presentation. They were stating that 
understanding the cloud forensic investigation process is of vital importance in order to 
design and implement cloud forensic-enabled services. The proposed process is illus-
trated in Figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1. Process for Cloud Forensic Investigation. 
Beside the five sequential steps presented in Figure 1 there are three more steps run-
ning throughout the investigation process. They are parallel activities/steps running 
concurrently with the four steps after the confirmation of the incident. These are: preser-
vation of evidence, documentation, and training and planning. 
Even though incident confirmation is not an actual step of the investigation process, 
it has to be included since it is the stage where the administrator of the Information 
Technology (IT) department and the stakeholders come together to decide whether the 
cloud investigation will start or not, depending on the type and the nature of the inci-
dent. It also depends on the organization’s available resources. During the incident 
identification stage, all relevant assets (software, hardware and data) that may contain 
potential evidence should be identified.   
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In the collection-acquisition stage, the main goal is to obtain the data and the poten-
tial evidence in a forensically sound manner. The acquired assets should be securely 
stored for further analysis. The examination and analysis stage includes the data extrac-
tion from the previous stage and the process to analyse the results in order to find any 
useful evidence. Finally, in the presentation stage experts should be prepared to con-
front the jury who lacks knowledge of cloud computing and try to present the evidence 
collected in a language that anyone can understand. The outcome of a trial depends on 
the weight of the evidence (how concrete they are). 
The three concurrent stages are needed in the investigation process since they are the 
most important and crucial parts of the process. If the evidence are not preserved, any-
one from the opposite side can challenge them. The same applies for the documentation 
since the chain of custody will not be maintained. As far as the training and planning 
stage concerns, it prepares and ensures that personnel, operations and infrastructures 
are able to support an investigation. 
3 Cloud Forensic Analysis 
Since cloud forensics is relative newly developed research area, our main and primary 
focus was to conduct a thorough analysis of the respective literature in order to identify 
and present a set of forensic constraints that can be the first step towards the creation 
of a set of forensic requirements. A reason of this analysis is to examine how the foren-
sic constraints involve in the investigation process. 
In [19-20] a thorough literature review was conducted based on the most cited papers 
presented in respective scientific journals, conferences, books and industrial reports. 
Based on the specific analysis, the cloud characteristics, and forensic properties, a set 
of forensic constraints were proposed and presented in [8]. The findings of this analysis 
constitute an initial but robust set of constraints that designers and software engineers 
need to consider when designing information systems or individual services in the 
cloud. 
3.1 Cloud Forensic High Level Requirements 
Frameworks, models and methodologies in cloud forensics, identify the necessary 
steps, methods, concepts or activities and produce useful information. This information 
can be used to specific cases to explain and resolve these cases. Beside the methodolo-
gies and models, the forensic requirements need to be clarified to specify capabilities 
and functions that a cloud service must be able to perform. The identified forensic re-
quirements introduced as forensic constraints since their implementation forces the 
mandatory use of specific technologies in addition to the existing functionality of the 
services, to eliminate the existing gap in the cloud environments. Forensic constraints 
are requirements related to system forensicability (the term forensicability is used as a 
service that can be forensic-enabled; can be developed in a forensically sound manner) 
and specify a service’s quality attributes. The seven identified forensic constraints are 
listed as follow. 
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Internal disciplinary procedure: process through which a CSP or a third party deals 
with its employees in order to ensure that they follow certain norms of discipline.  
Accountability: CSP’s obligation to protect and use consumer’s data with responsibility 
for its actions and liability in case of an issue. 
Transparency: condition where an entity can have full access to manage and control its 
own data at any given time and allow feedback from the entities that accommodate it. 
Legal matters (Regulatory): procedures and actions that need to be undertaken related 
to jurisdiction issues, international law, contractual terms, legislative frameworks and 
constitutional issues. 
Access rights (Policies) is the permissions that are assigned by an administrator to grand 
users and applications access to specific operations. Security (data protection) mecha-
nisms for authentication, authorization, access controls, and auditing are parts of this 
concept. 
Isolation is the mechanism to ensure that each consumers’ data is sealed and cannot be 
seen by other tenants. 
Traceability is the ability, for the data to be traced or not by the user [21] and the capa-
bility of keeping track of the actions taken at any given point. It also refers to the ability 
to trace the activities of a consumer in order to lead to him/her. 
3.2 Framework for Reasoning about Cloud Forensics 
It is indeed true that designing cloud services capable of assisting investigators to solve 
an incident is a huge challenge. A thorough analysis of the respective literature revealed 
that there is a literature gap in supporting software engineers so as to identify forensic-
related requirements for information systems [10]. Thus, to fill the aforementioned gap, 
a presentation of a requirements engineering framework is introduced in [8], to support 
software engineers in the elicitation of forensic requirements and the design of forensic-
enabled cloud services. The framework supports cloud services by implementing a 
number of steps to make the services cloud forensic-enabled. It consists of a set of cloud 
forensic feature diagrams (one for each forensic constraint), a modelling language ex-
pressed through a conceptual meta-model and a process based on the concepts identi-
fied and presented in the meta-model. 
 
Feature Diagrams. The initial step of our research framework was the design of a set 
of feature diagrams based on the identified forensic constraints. For every proposed 
forensic constraint a feature diagram has been introduced for expressing the basic tasks 
that need to be realized. These diagrams are used to describe the necessary tasks a cloud 
provider need to consider in order to make a cloud service forensic-enabled. Each fea-
ture diagram consists of a set of tasks/nodes that implement a specific forensic con-
straint. A detailed description of all the feature diagrams and their tasks has been pre-
sented in [8]. Also, in section 4, a table (Table 1) is introduced illustrating the different 
tasks for each forensic constraint. To understand how the feature diagrams of the seven 
forensic constraints work, one of them, the internal disciplinary procedures feature di-
agram is illustrated in Figure 2 and explained as follow. 
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The feature diagram for internal disciplinary procedures constraint presents the tasks 
that need to be fulfilled to ensure that the constraint is successfully implemented. Cloud 
providers should implement discipline rules and in case of any deviations, CSP should 
be able to discipline the responsible party without harming its interests. Access rights, 
both physical and digital should be categorized and their allowance should be granted 
accordingly. Contracts between the CSP and its personnel should be signed, stating all 
the details about misuse of information and the penalties. In the case that one or more 
of the previous tasks have not been fulfilled, the provider should seek or implement 
techniques that resolve the issue. The same applies for all the constraints listed in the 
paper. The rest of the feature diagrams have been illustrated and can be viewed in [8]. 
Internal Disciplinary 
Procedures 
Constraint
Implement discipline 
rules
Enable access rights
Enforce legal 
contracts
 
Fig. 2. Internal disciplinary procedures feature diagram 
In order for a cloud service to be characterized as forensic-enabled, all the aforemen-
tioned seven cloud forensic constraints should be realized at the same time. The imple-
mentation of a service consists of numerous actions that need to be carefully examined 
to prevent malicious activities. These actions can be implemented using one or more 
forensic constraints. In the case that a forensic constraint is not satisfied, the investiga-
tion does not meet the forensic requirements and cannot be characterized as 100% sat-
isfactory. 
 
Meta-model. The second step of the framework was to propose a common modelling 
language in order to support the elicitation and modelling of the aforementioned foren-
sic constraints. The modelling language is presented in terms of a meta-model, based 
on the concepts and the forensic constraints identified for designing a cloud forensic-
enabled system [8]. Figure 3 presents the meta-model, which consists both the concepts 
of making a system or a service forensic-enabled and the concepts that form a cloud 
forensic investigation process. The two groups of concepts are separated with each 
other with the dotted lines. The one inside the dotted lines is the investigation process 
group, while the other outside of the lines is the forensic-enabled group. All relation-
ships among critical components are illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Fig. 3. Meta-model for assisting a cloud forensic process 
Framework Process. The last step to the completion of the framework was the devel-
opment of a process based on the concepts identified and presented in the meta-model. 
The process provides the necessary steps towards the design of a cloud forensic-enabled 
service, based on the potential vulnerabilities of the service and the systematic analysis 
of forensic requirements.  
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Fig. 4. Forensic requirements engineering process for cloud forensic-enabled services 
On one hand, it assists in the identification of the organizational strategy and needs 
and on the other, it analyses in depth the various organizational cloud services in order 
to provide the necessary requirements for well-structured cloud forensic-enabled ser-
vices. The revised process consists of four main stages: Organizational Analysis, Cloud 
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Forensic Requirements Analysis, Evaluation-Assessment and Forensic Investigation 
Validation. The first three stages have been introduced and explained in [8], while the 
fourth one will be presented and detailed described in section 4 of this paper. Figure 4 
illustrates the stages and sub-stages of the process. 
4 Cloud Forensic Requirements and their support in the 
Investigation Process 
In order to align the design of forensic-enabled cloud services with the investigation 
process, the seven forensic constraints introduced in [8] have been considered and used. 
The forensic constraints and their tasks need to fulfil specific stages or inputs and out-
puts of the investigation process in order to assist the investigators. Within the follow-
ing paragraphs, an alignment of the design of cloud forensic-enabled services is intro-
duced together with the extension of our previous work [8]. 
4.1 Forensic Investigation Validation 
A new stage is introduced in the forensic requirements engineering process that has to 
deal with the validation of the selected forensic enabled services against the investiga-
tion process. This new stage is placed at the end of the process after the “Evaluation-
Assessment”. It is called “Investigation Process Alignment” and it consists of two steps: 
“Define Solutions” and “Validation”. In order to assist the investigators when conduct-
ing an investigation following the process described in section 3.2.3, an analysis of the 
seven forensic constraints and the identification of their relation to the proposed foren-
sic investigation stages is presented. This has to be explained and understood, so as to 
proceed with the description of the two steps of the new stage. 
The first forensic constraint, the internal disciplinary procedures contributes to the 
investigation process in the following ways. Enforcing legal contracts task assists to the 
incident identification stage with the use of the SLAs. All the contracts should be read 
in order to prepare the line of defence and the strategy. On the other hand, the team that 
will be formed to investigate the incident will be in co-operation with the personnel 
who work in the provider’s facilities. Implement discipline rules should be realized at 
the same stage so as to exclude the providers’ personnel, especially those who work in 
the investigation team and handle the evidence. The access right of the constraint real-
izes the preservation of evidence stage. Only the personnel that has the proper rights 
can access specific parts of the infrastructures, eliminating the danger of handling the 
evidence by unwanted users, aiming to narrow access immediately when an incident 
occurs. Due to the specific constraint a refined actors list will be produced that it con-
tributes to the collection and acquisition stage. 
Both the accountability and transparency constraints contributes to the investigation 
process in three different stages, beginning with the evidence examination and analysis 
stage. With the use of special tools, the examination of data takes place. Metadata and 
evidence are produced concerning the actions of a specific person or different persons. 
This information will be used in a court, so the provider and the people accessing the 
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data should be transparent and accountable about the process and their actions. The next 
two stages are the preservation of evidence and documentation. During the investiga-
tion, all data and potential evidence should be preserved in order to maintain the chain 
of custody. At the same time, personnel actions, assets used and resources provided 
should be clear documented, so no one can challenge the outcome of the process. In 
order the investigator's team working on the incident to succeed on this, they should be 
transparent and accountable for their actions at all times. Besides the above contribu-
tion, the accountability constraint also assists to confirmation of the incident by provid-
ing attributability. In other words, to reveal the system element or the actor, responsible 
for a deviation from the expected behavior. On the other hand, the task monitor action 
is realized in the incident identification stage by monitoring all the actions of the team. 
As far as the legal matters constraint is concerned, it assists a wider range of stages 
in the investigation process. In particular, it realizes the incident identification stage 
with two of its tasks, the SLAs and jurisdiction. From the SLAs point of view, all con-
tracts and agreements should be read and reviewed to understand all the legal and tech-
nical aspects - rights and obligations. This will help to determine the strategy the inves-
tigators will take to fulfil the goals. From the jurisdiction point of view, depending on 
the contracts, application of warranty should be produced to grant permissions to dif-
ferent stages of the investigation. The next stage that the specific constraint is applied 
to is the preservation of evidence with the maintained trained personnel task. The or-
ganization’s persons that will assist in the investigation need to be trained in laws and 
legislations in relation to the Information Technology. By providing the appropriate 
trained personnel, the constraint fulfils the concurrent stage, training and planning of 
the investigation process, at the same time. This is because the personnel will be trained 
to be able to manage any issues that arise and update strategy and plans in accordance. 
Another point is that the preservation of evidence is exclusively related to legal matters 
due to the legal frameworks. There are specific rules, policies and regulations on how 
to preserve the evidence and what processes should be followed. The last stage that the 
legal matters constraint is applied to is in the presentation. It provides the testimony 
and the documentation of the evidence. In order for a cloud service to be forensic-ena-
bled, investigators should take under consideration all the legal aspects and present 
them in a court. 
The forensic constraint of access rights is very important in the evidence examina-
tion and analysis stage. Depending on the access rights given to the consumers, inves-
tigators can put the bits and pieces stored in the log files together. Log files include 
timestamps with the users’ movements, date and time of all authentication and author-
ization access to the cloud services and accessed files. During the examination of logs, 
a timeline with the reconstruction of events of the incident can be produced and 
metadata can be provided. However, access rights constraint also assists to the preser-
vation of evidence stage. It provides the documentation of how the evidence were iden-
tified, collected and acquired by investigators, providers and external users, during the 
investigation process. 
The isolation constraint besides the ability of separating the users with one another, 
reflecting the difficulty of the perpetrator to contaminate the rest of the consumers, also 
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assists to the cloud forensic investigation process in the following way. During the col-
lection and acquisition stage, it provides confidentiality and privacy to the consumers 
sharing the same resources by not allowing access to their sensitive data since they are 
isolated from the rest of the users. In that way, people responsible for collecting poten-
tial evidence can move forward without worrying about privacy violation. 
Finally, the traceability constraint fits into the investigation process in two different 
stages. On one hand, at the confirmation of the incident, where the detection of the 
incident occurs by different sources such as personnel, detection systems, etc. Monitor-
ing users’ activities and data logs (two of the tasks of the traceability constraint) can 
allow systems to capture an incident by detecting any malfunctions or abnormal activ-
ities. After the detection, it is up to the organization will to decide whether the incident 
imposes an immediate threat or not. On the other hand, all four tasks of the traceability 
constraint can fulfil the examination and analysis stage. Since data is monitored and 
recorded in log files, investigators can search for these log files during the examination 
stage and find evidence such as timestamps, metadata or any other information. Log 
files are also responsible for providing correct timelines and reconstruction of the 
events, as a result to link users with their data. Besides the two main stages, traceability 
assists also in the concurrent activities of preservation of evidence and documentation. 
By storing and securing the log files in restricted areas and taking back-up on a daily 
basis, investigators can be almost certain that the chain of custody can be preserved and 
the integrity of the evidence will be maintained at all times. Reports and lists can be 
also produced from the log files in order to proper document the investigation process.  
Now that the seven forensic constraints have been presented in relation to the pro-
posed forensic investigation stages, it is clear their contribution to the investigation 
process. Thus, the next step is a detailed description of the two steps of the last stage of 
the proposed process in order to understand its importance. 
 
Define solutions. This step of the process concerns the selection of the solutions. In 
stage 2 of the framework process, a selection of the technologies for the implementation 
of forensic constraints took place based on specific criteria. A number of different tech-
nologies/solutions have been presented for each task that fulfills the implementation of 
the constraint. At this point, software engineers should choose the most appropriate 
solution out of the selected ones that fits into their organization. The selected solution 
for each forensic constraint will be summarized in the cloud service template [8] intro-
duced in the first stage of the process. 
Table 1 presents the seven forensic constraints and their tasks in relation to the cloud 
investigation process and the stage or stages they apply to. It specifies which task of the 
constraint fulfils and fits to a specific stage or stages of the process. The first two col-
umns illustrate the forensic constraints and their tasks. The third column illustrates the 
different stages of the investigation that the constraint/tasks fulfils, while the last one, 
presents the existing solutions for the specific challenge of the forensic constraint’s 
task. Observing Table 1 someone can notice that all seven forensic constraints contrib-
ute to the cloud forensic investigation process. All the stages of the process are aligned 
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to the seven constraints. This validates that the proposed seven forensic constraints in-
terfere/influence the cloud forensic investigation and they take under consideration the 
investigation process. 
 
Validation. The last step of the framework process is the validation where software 
engineers validate the selected solution against the investigation process based on the 
input of Table 1. The selected solution is tested using a scenario in order to investigate 
if it is capable to overcome the problems. An incident is initiated and software engineers 
follow all the investigation process steps in a forensically sound manner to validate the 
technology/solution chosen and the framework itself. 
Table 1.  Forensic requirements contribution to cloud investigation process 
Constraint Task Fulfillment Indicative Solutions 
Internal  
disciplinary 
procedures 
Implement discipline 
rules 
Incident identification – 
Collection and acquisition 
Define SLA parameters and 
objectives - Robust SLAs 
Enable access rights 
Preservation of evidence – 
Collection and acquisition 
Organizational policies and 
SLAs 
Enforce legal contracts  
Incident identification – 
Collection and acquisition 
Well and clear-written terms - 
Robust SLAs 
Accountability 
Ensure agreements 
Incident identification – 
Evidence examination & 
analysis – Documentation 
Define SLA parameters and 
objectives - Robust SLAs 
Provide assurance 
Evidence examination & 
analysis – Documentation 
Accountable cloud - External 
auditors 
Monitor actions 
Preservation of evidence – 
Evidence examination & 
analysis – Documentation 
Detailed documentation from 
start to end - Distributed sig-
nature detection framework - 
Unified time system 
Provide attributability 
Confirmation of the inci-
dent – Evidence examina-
tion & analysis – Docu-
mentation 
Accountable cloud - Define 
SLA parameters and objec-
tives 
Transparency 
Ensure visibility 
Evidence examination & 
analysis – Documentation 
Accountable cloud - 
TrustCloud framework 
Provide procedures and 
policies of treating data 
Evidence examination & 
analysis – Documentation 
Define SLA parameters and 
objectives - Robust SLAs 
Provide notification on 
policy violation 
Evidence examination & 
analysis – Documentation 
Accountable cloud - Robust 
SLAs 
Legal matters 
Define SLAs 
Incident identification – 
Presentation 
Define SLA parameters and 
objectives - Robust SLAs 
Ensure jurisdiction 
Incident identification – 
Presentation 
Faster compliance with court 
orders - International laws 
Maintain trained per-
sonnel 
Preservation of evidence – 
Update training & plan-
ning libraries – Presenta-
tion 
Team collaboration with wide 
range of skills - Trained and 
qualified personnel 
Access rights 
Ensure registration and 
validation control 
Preservation of evidence – 
Evidence examination & 
analysis 
Logging mechanism - Secure-
Logging-as-a-service - Digital 
signature 
Enable authentication 
and authorization con-
trol 
Preservation of evidence – 
Evidence examination & 
analysis 
Logging framework - Digital 
forensic readiness model 
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Enable access control 
Preservation of evidence – 
Evidence examination & 
analysis 
Level of access - Organiza-
tional policies and SLAs 
Isolation 
Ensure users do not 
have access to each 
other 
Collection and acquisition 
Proofs Of Retrievability - 
Identity and access manage-
ment in future internet archi-
tecture  
Prevent contamination 
of other users 
Collection and acquisition 
Compartmentalization - Intru-
sion Detection Systems 
Provide confidentiality Collection and acquisition 
Multi-tenancy model - Digital 
forensic readiness model - 
DAC-MACS 
Traceability 
Monitor user activities 
Confirmation of the inci-
dent – Evidence examina-
tion & analysis 
Log-based model - Log man-
agement architecture 
Monitor data logs 
Confirmation of the inci-
dent – Evidence examina-
tion & analysis 
SecLaas - Log management 
architecture 
Store and secure logs 
Evidence examination & 
analysis 
SecLaas-RW - Log manage-
ment 
Link users to data 
Evidence examination & 
analysis 
Identity management - Iden-
tity governance 
4.2 Digital Forensic Readiness 
The main purpose of the proposed alignment is the identification of the degree of the 
forensic readiness of a specific cloud service against a forensic investigation. A number 
of researchers introduced various definitions for cloud forensic readiness [22-24]. In 
[25] cloud forensic readiness has been defined as “The organization’s preparations to 
minimize the impact of an incident in a cloud forensic investigation, while identifying 
and acquiring the maximum amount of digital evidence”.  
Cloud forensic readiness is a subset of digital forensics readiness and it designates 
the need for digital forensic readiness in cloud environments. DFR is important due to 
the fact that organizations can fortify behind activities and processes that can predict 
and assist investigators in case of an incident. ISO/IEC 27043: 2015 [26] deals with 
investigative readiness and the steps that need to be taken prior to an incident occurring. 
ISO/IEC 27043: 2015 is the only international standard that includes detailed guidelines 
on the implementation of DFR as a process [27]. The readiness process class is shown 
outside of the dotted lines since it is a precautionary measure or proactive process that 
does not have to be involved (an optional process) in the reactive Digital Forensic In-
vestigation (DFI) process [28]. 
5 Conclusion 
Cloud Service Providers bring services to consumers on demand through the internet. 
In order to provide these services in a forensically sound manner, CSPs should be able 
to design and implement the services taking under consideration specific forensic re-
quirements. This will assist investigators to acquire and examine evidence in accord-
ance to the forensic investigation rules and procedures and produce admissible evidence 
15 
in a court. The research community should bend over the specific field and produce 
reliable solutions towards this direction. In this paper, an alignment between the foren-
sic requirements that are included in the design of forensic-enabled cloud services and 
the cloud forensic investigation process took place providing a form of validation to 
our previous work regarding the design of a framework for designing forensic-enabled 
cloud services. The results of the validation are encouraging since all the different 
stages of the investigation process align with the proposed forensic requirements. 
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